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Politecnico di Torino, Italy
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Abstract—The DNS is a fundamental service that has been re-
peatedly attacked and abused. DNS manipulation is a prominent
case: Recursive DNS resolvers are deployed to explicitly return
manipulated answers to users’ queries. While DNS manipulation
is used for legitimate reasons too (e.g., parental control), rogue
DNS resolvers support malicious activities, such as malware and
viruses, exposing users to phishing and content injection.
We introduce REMeDy, a system that assists operators to
identify the use of rogue DNS resolvers in their networks.
REMeDy is a completely automatic and parameter-free system
that evaluates the consistency of responses across the resolvers
active in the network. It operates by passively analyzing DNS
traffic and, as such, requires no active probing of third-party
servers. REMeDy is able to detect resolvers that manipulate
answers, including resolvers that affect unpopular domains.
We validate REMeDy using large-scale DNS traces collected in
ISP networks where more than 100 resolvers are regularly used
by customers. REMeDy automatically identifies regular resolvers,
and pinpoint manipulated responses. Among those, we identify
both legitimate services that offer additional protection to clients,
and resolvers under the control of malwares that steer traffic with
likely malicious goals.
I. INTRODUCTION
The DNS is fundamental to the Internet, since it translates
Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs) into IP addresses.
The DNS is a large-scale system composed of millions of
servers that interact to resolve users’ queries. Operators usually
deploy recursive DNS resolvers to handle the resolution of
queries close to their users. It is however common to find
users that intentionally opt for open recursive resolvers (e.g.,
Google’s DNS or OpenDNS) or, perhaps unintentionally, rely
on arbitrary resolvers. The latter may happen, for instance,
when software installed in users’ machines change DNS con-
figurations automatically, e.g., some parental control solutions
that block access to non-authorized or unsafe domains.
Recursive DNS resolvers are expected to answer users’
queries by reaching the authoritative resolver for the FQDN.
However the DNS has been repeatedly attacked and abused.
Among the millions of open DNS resolvers in the Internet,
it is strikingly common to find resolvers that manipulate
responses [4], [9]. In other words, some recursive resolvers
sometimes answer queries with responses that diverge from
what is returned by the authoritative ones. Such manipulations
may occur due to legitimate reasons (e.g., parental control), but
a variety of malware and viruses change clients’ DNS setup
too, e.g., to force users into phishing websites or to perform
content injection. This latter case is illustrated in Fig. 1, where
an infected client (yellow) contacts a malicious DNS resolver
and queries for a sensitive FQDN (e.g., mybank.com), but re-
ceives the IP address of a fake web server as answer. Whereas
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Fig. 1: DNS manipulation through forged DNS responses.
solutions such as DNSSEC provide the means for clients to
check authenticity and integrity of response and, thus, detect
DNS manipulations, they are still barely deployed [6], letting
users exposed to such malicious rogue DNS resolvers.
It is thus not a surprise that several studies have focused
on DNS anomalies. Some works propose generic methods to
identify anomalies in the DNS [1], [2], [7], such as DNS cache
poisoning. Regarding DNS manipulations, seminal works [3],
[12] use active measurements and manual heuristics to profile
open resolvers. Similar methodology is employed by authors
of [13], who also download pages from web servers hosted
in the IP addresses returned by open resolvers, searching for
anomalies and signs of manipulations. More recently, authors
of [10], [4] have revisited the problem proposing new active
methodologies to detect manipulations. They have scanned the
complete IPv4 Internet and found millions of open resolvers
that manipulate responses. Similar steps are performed by a
system called Iris [9] that aims at identifying the use of DNS
manipulations for implementing censorship in the Internet.
Previous works however require active probing of external
servers. We here face the question on whether and how DNS
manipulations can be detected directly from the DNS traffic.
This would allow network operators to identify clients exposed
to manipulations without the burdens of periodically probing
external hosts for suspicious DNS resolutions.
We thus introduce REMeDy, REsolver Manipulation De-
tector, a system to help operators identify the use of rogue
DNS resolvers in their networks. The identification of rogue
resolvers from passive traffic observation comes with many
challenges. First, DNS load balancing techniques are com-
monly used by Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and cloud
systems, so that answers may vary widely, e.g., changing over
time and based on the geographical position of the client
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Fig. 2: REMeDy architecture and building blocks.
and DNS resolver. Second, malicious resolvers may return
perfectly legitimate answers to the large majority of queries,
while modifying only a small subset of queries, e.g., for very
specific FQDNs involved on click fraud campaigns.
REMeDy is completely automatic and parameter-free. It
evaluates the consistency of responses across all resolvers
by extracting features directly from the DNS traffic. These
features include the number and type of records on DNS
responses, typical values of Time To Live (TTL) fields, and
the Autonomous System (AS) of returned IP addresses. We
rely on statistical methodologies to pinpoint deviation from the
legitimate answers, which in turn are automatically identified
from the traffic.
We validate REMeDy by facing a case study. We let it run
on traffic traces collected from operational networks where
the most used resolvers have been manually profiled and
the manipulating resolvers have been manually identified.
We show that REMeDy is able to detect the manipulating
resolvers, including some legitimate and well known services
(e.g., providing parental control, or antivirus filtering services).
Finally, REMeDy is able to pinpoint malicious resolvers that
only sporadically manipulate answers to force users to go
through fake servers likely under the control of attackers.
II. REMEDY DETECTION ALGORITHM
REMeDy aims at finding manipulated DNS responses, in-
cluding those provided by rogue resolvers that divert traffic
to specific malicious servers. It processes batches of DNS
traffic from a (potentially large) network and outputs detailed
insights about DNS anomalies. REMeDy is parameter-free and
completely unsupervised as it does not require any ground
truth for training. Its architecture is depicted in Fig. 2.
The system operates in four stages. First, it extracts features
from live DNS traffic passively observed in the network.
Second, it aggregates responses in a per-Domain fashion,
and computes statistics about the resolutions. Statistical-based
anomaly detection unveils uncommon DNS resolutions, which
are marked as suspicious. Third, to filter out false positives
(e.g., anomalous responses due to CDNs, load balancing
and unpopular resolvers), REMeDy aggregates responses per-
(Resolver,AS), thus evaluating properties of destinations
where users are directed when resolving domains. Finally,
resolutions tagged as anomalous by both stages are used
to determine the final list of manipulators, and results are
presented along with statistics that explain the source of the
anomalies.
We next detail each of these four stages. Table I summarizes
the terminology used in the following sections.
TABLE I: Main terminology used throughout the section.
R The IP address of a recursive resolver
D The queried domain name (i.e., a FQDN)
f A feature extracted from DNS response packets
Freq(D, f)
Frequency distribution of feature f for responses
to queries for domain D regardless of resolver
Freq(R,ASN, f)
Frequency distribution of feature f for the resolver
R when resolving to ASN
A. Feature extraction
REMeDy is given as input DNS responses observed in
the monitored network, e.g., traffic captured using passive
monitoring tools. The system processes traffic in batches, i.e.,
it groups all DNS responses observed in a period of time (e.g.,
1 day), and extracts features to identify DNS manipulations.
DNS responses are parsed to inspect the DNS Resource
Records (RRs); a RR is the basic information element of the
DNS protocol. From each DNS response, REMeDy extracts
R and D, respectively the IP address of the resolver and
the queried domain. Then, the actual features are retrieved.
REMeDy considers 4 features:
• NA, the number of A (IPv4) and AAAA (IPv6) records in
the response;
• NCNAME , the number of CNAME records used to specify
domain aliases in the response;
• TTL of A or AAAA records. When several records are
present, we take the maximum TTL, although in practice
all records usually have the same TTL within a packet;
• ASNs, the list of Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs)
of server IP addresses in A and AAAA records. Resolvers
often return many A or AAAA records, e.g., when the
queried domain is hosted on multiple servers.
All features are computed directly from the RRs, except
ASNs. We further process returned server IP addresses to
improve the detection of manipulations. Popular web services
rely on big infrastructures to cope with the workload of a
large number of users. Some services take advantage of cloud
providers and CDNs that deploy thousands of servers hosted
in many networks. As a consequence, the several queries
for a single domain are often resolved to diverse IP ad-
dresses located in different data-centers, networks and possibly
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Fig. 3: Freq(www.google-analytics.com, ASNs): frequency
distribution of ASNs for a domain of Google Analytics.
ASes [11]. This behavior makes it virtually impossible to
detect anomalous resolutions based on IP addresses.
Thus, we replace IP addresses by ASNs to reduce the
variability in the list of returned IP addresses. The mapping
from IP addresses to ASNs can be done online through
services like Whois and Team Cymru. Alternatively, platforms
like BGPStream [8] can be leveraged to create a local database
of ASNs.1
B. Suspicious response detection
The detection of suspicious responses is performed in
two steps. First, REMeDy consolidates statistics across all
responses related to each domain D. Then, the distributions
of values for each feature are evaluated and the pairs of
resolver and domain, i.e., (R,D), responsible for the outliers
are included in a list of suspicious resolutions.
1) Frequency distributions: The first step of REMeDy is
to consolidate statistics for each queried domain. For this, it
aggregates features for all responses matching each domain
D. The intuition is that the majority of resolvers will provide
answers with similar features, and only those that diverge from
the majority are worth evaluating for possible manipulations.
REMeDy collects the responses given D and computes the
frequency distribution Freq(D, f) for the observed values of
each feature f . For instance, considering the ASNs in all
responses matching D, REMeDy computes a vector containing
how often each ASN is present in responses to queries for D.
Note that these statistics are evaluated taking into account all
responses, regardless the resolver.
2) Anomaly detection: REMeDy evaluates Freq(D, f), for
all D, and outputs the list of suspicious resolvers. One possible
approach to detect suspicious resolvers could be (i) to calculate
the frequency distributions for D and f considering each
resolver R, and (ii) to compare these conditional distributions
against Freq(D, f). Unfortunately, a direct comparison is not
effective since the number of samples can be very low for
unpopular resolvers. As such, unpopular resolvers would often
be marked as suspicious.
REMeDy focuses on outliers of the distributions
Freq(D, f). The intuition is illustrated in Fig. 3, which
depicts Freq(D, f) for D = www.google-analytics.com and
f = ASNn. This figure is built with a sample of the DNS
traffic used for validating the performance of the system.
1We tested other grouping alternatives, e.g., by /24 subnet, which result in
rather noisy groups. When the ASN information is missing we use /16 subnet.
TABLE II: TTLMAX for www.google-analytics.com.
Resolver Maximum TTL [sec]
ISP DNS 1 300
ISP DNS 2 300
Google DNS 300
OpenDNS 1 300
AdWare 38400
Note the logarithmic y-axis. For the vast majority of queries,
resolvers answer with IP addresses belonging to the ASNs of
Google or the Internet Service Provider (ISP) in which the
data has been collected. The latter happens because of CDN
nodes hosted in the ISP network. A long tail of unpopular
ASNs is also visible. Manual inspection reveals that those
unpopular ASNs are in manipulated responses connected to
malwares that divert traffic to fake web servers.
REMeDy needs to identify these groups automatically for
all features f , and without any training. REMeDy takes two
distinct approaches depending on the feature.
a) Categorical features: ASNs is clearly a categorical
feature, as only the equivalence relation can be defined. Al-
though numerical, NA and NCNAME typically assume values
smaller than 10, thus suggesting considering them categorical
features too, rather than numerical.
To discover anomalies from categorical features REMeDy
relies on classical techniques to find outliers. We build on
the well known box plot rule [5], which leverages the lower
(Q1) and the upper quartiles (Q3) of a distribution to define
the Inter Quartile Range (IQR) as IQR = Q3−Q1. Then, all
instances lying below Q1−1.5 ·IQR or above Q3+1.5 ·IQR
are considered outliers.2
We apply the technique to values of Freq(D, f) to find
outliers given each domain D and feature f . Since the dis-
tributions can only take positive values, we consider outliers
all those values of features lying above Q3 + 1.5 · IQR
for the respective Freq(D, f). Then, REMeDy considers as
suspicious any pair (R,D) behind a DNS response with a
categorical feature that falls in the range of outliers.
b) The TTL feature: TTL is a numerical feature, in
particular a number expressed in seconds. It thus allows
central tendency and dispersion measures. However, given the
machine-generated nature of the feature, some ingenuity helps
to improve the quality of the anomaly detector.
Each DNS response carries a TTL computed from the one
originally set by the authoritative name server. When asked
for a domain, a recursive resolver queries the authoritative
server and, once the response is obtained, caches it until the
TTL expires. A subsequent request for the domain will be
quickly answered, as it is locally resolved without involving
the authoritative server. This second response carries exactly
the same RRs as the original one, except for the TTL that
is decreased by the time elapsed between the responses. The
resolver invalidates the local cache when the TTL expires
and recontacts the authoritative server, thus renewing the
TTL. Because of this caching mechanism, TTL values smaller
than what is set by the authoritative resolvers are completely
legitimate and common.
2We tested other approaches, all leading to worse final results.
4TABLE III: Freq(R,ASN, f) for a R that is known to be a rogue resolver. The last line corresponds to forged resolutions.
ASN AS Name NA NCNAME TTL Resolved Domains
15169 Google Inc., US 1,2,3,4,6,8,10. . . 0,1,2 [0− 30] www.google.com, www.youtube.com, gmail.com. . .
32934 Facebook, Inc., US 1 0,1,2 [0− 3600] www.facebook.com, connect.facebook.net, static.xx.fbcdn.net. . .
20940 AKAMAI-ASN1, US 1,2 0,1,2,3,4,5 [0− 43200] www.microsoft.com, i.alicdn.com, cdncache-a.akamaihd.net. . .
1680 NetVision Ltd., Israel 1 0 300 www.google-analytics.com, gstatic.com, static.chartbeat.com. . .
REMeDy uses this domain knowledge to estimate the orig-
inal TTL set by the authoritative server for each domain D.
In particular, we define TTLMAX(R,D) to be the maximum
TTL observed for the resolver R and domain D. We then
can compute Freq(D, f = “TTLMAX”), as the frequency
distribution of TTLMAX across all resolvers for the domain
D. The intuition is illustrated in Table II, which shows the
TTLMAX(R,D) for D = www.google-analytics.com and five
resolvers. The same sample dataset of Fig. 3 is used. For most
resolvers, we observe TTLMAX(R,D) = 300, suggesting
that this is the value set by the authoritative server. The
(abnormally) high value set by last resolver is suspicious.
Once Freq(D, f = “TTLMAX”) is calculated, the detec-
tion of outliers is performed following again the box plot rule.
REMeDy then adds to the list of suspicious resolutions any
pair (R,D) with TTL in the range marked as outlier for the
TTLMAX of domain D.
C. ASN analysis
The set of (R,D) that are marked as suspicious includes
manipulations, but also false positives. This is expected since
in the previous stage REMeDy considers suspicious all resolu-
tions diverging from the majority. However, some users may
opt to use resolvers located in networks that are physically
far away from the place where they are connected. Resolvers
in different places may behave differently. For instance, the
remote resolver may provide optimized responses based on its
location, e.g., redirecting users to CDN nodes that are close
to it. Such resolutions are put in the suspicious list too.
Thus, REMeDy performs a second round of anomaly de-
tection to polish the suspicious list. While the previous stage
focuses on how each domain is resolved by the several
resolvers, this second stage focuses on finding resolutions that
are redirected to suspicious autonomous systems.
The intuition is simple. Each resolver answers queries
related to a variety of web services that are hosted in dif-
ferent autonomous systems. If an AS hosts multiples popular
domains, the features characterizing responses pointing to the
AS are expected to present variability, e.g., the TTL should
vary from response to response. Resolvers that manipulate
responses alter this behavior. For example, malware returns
IP addresses belonging to the ASes hosting attacker’s servers
for various domains. Hence, features of such responses do not
follow general patterns, i.e., present little variability.
REMeDy implements a simple rule proven sufficient to filter
out false positives from the list of suspicious (R,D) pairs.
From original features, REMeDy calculates statistics in
a per-(Resolver,ASN) level, thus analyzing together all
resolutions of a resolver R that point to each ASN . REMeDy
calculates Freq(R,ASN, f), i.e., the frequency distribution
for the feature f , considering responses in which the resolver
R has returned the given ASN . Then, REMeDy isolates the
cases in which Freq(R,ASN, f) has no variability for at least
two features – i.e., two features among NA, NCNAME and
TTL present always the same value, given (R,ASN).
Table III illustrates the mechanism with an example related
to a rogue resolver. This particular resolver manipulates re-
sponses only for a subset of domains. When one of such
domains is queried, the resolver redirects users to the ASN
1680. Otherwise, legitimate ASes are returned. The table
shows values of NA, NCNAME and TTL for the ASNs
returned by the resolver, as well as some of the queried
domains. We see that when the resolver is providing legitimate
answers, features exhibit variability (lines 1,2,3). On the
contrary, forged responses have fixed feature values (line 4).
The analysis described above comes with an extra caveat.
Freq(R,ASN, f) will naturally present little or no variability
if only a few samples are present, as well as if the given ASN
hosts only a couple of domains that are seldom resolved. In
other words, REMeDy needs to ignore Freq(R,ASN, f) if
a low number of resolutions points to ASN , or if only few
domains are present in responses leading to ASN .
Freq(R,ASN, f) is thus considered valid only if two
conditions are satisfied. Given (R,ASN), (i) the number of
domains resolved to the ASN must be large; (ii) the average
number of resolutions per domain leading to ASN must
be large. Clearly, thresholds are needed to define large in
both cases. Since our goal is to make REMeDy completely
parameter-free, we adopt a simple rule-of-thumb to determine
the thresholds. We consider Freq(R,ASN, f) valid if those
quantities are above the median values computed from all res-
olutions that are not in the suspicious list of the previous stage.
Considering metrics other than median does not significantly
change the final result.
Pairs (R,D) that are in resolutions leading to valid samples
of Freq(R,ASN, f) filter out the suspicious list. In other
words, only pairs of resolver and domain (R,D) passing both
anomaly detection stages are declared manipulations.
D. DNS activity report
Resolvers that pass both anomaly detection stages are con-
sider manipulators. REMeDy creates a per-resolver report and
present it to the analyst. The report provides a summary of the
global DNS activity (e.g., the number of queries) and details
about the features leading to the tagging of particular resolvers
(e.g., domains presenting anomalous features).
The latter allows the analyst to spot the websites manipu-
lated by the resolver. We will show next that by evaluating the
manipulated features, one can already gain some knowledge
about the type of manipulation performed by the resolver.
5TABLE IV: DNS traces from operational networks.
Name Duration Log Size Queries Clients Resolvers
ISP1 7 Days 173 GB 273 M 7,500 690
ISP2 7 Days 51 GB 172 M 5,000 145
Campus 7 Days 186 GB 135 M 10,000 199
III. VALIDATION
A. Datasets
We rely on 3 datasets coming from operational networks.
All datasets have been captured in 2017 from vantage points
that observe all DSN traffic generated by a population of users.
We use Tstat3, a passive monitor that exports flow level
statistics. For DNS traffic, Tstat can also export packet-level
information, including the Transaction Identifier, Response
Code and flags of DNS responses. Moreover, Tstat exports
details about Resource Records (RR) in each packet: Query,
(eventual) Answer, Type of Record, Class, Time-To-Live, etc.
Table IV summarizes the datasets. ISP1 and ISP2 come
from an European ISP. Respectively 7,500 and 5,000 ADSL
and Fiber-To-The-Home customers are monitored. The third
dataset, Campus, comes from a University Campus hosting
more than 10,000 people.
Captures have been performed during one full week. Users
in these networks have contacted hundreds of DNS resolvers
in the week. More than 500 million queries to the DNS have
been performed during the captures.
B. REMeDy performance
Obtaining the ground truth to validate REMeDy is not
trivial. No service there exists providing classification of open
resolvers, nor there are exhaustive lists of the rogue ones.
Because of that, we validate REMeDy directly by deploying
it in production and manually evaluating its outcomes.
We make use of ISP1 trace, and manually check all
resolvers generating more than 1,000 response packets. Among
the 690 resolvers observed during the week of analysis, we
have investigated 111 resolvers manually. We have collected
information about them from various sources: by searching
the Web for information, by performing active measurements
to verify the content of resolutions and by investigating the
websites of companies hosting the resolvers.
We have found that 14 resolvers are deployed by the mon-
itored ISPs, 43 are open resolvers serving different purposes,
and 33 resolvers are related to some kind of malware. Finally,
21 resolvers are used by antivirus clients for DNS tunneling.
Anomalies reported by REMeDy are summarized in Ta-
ble V. REMeDy correctly finds no anomalies among the ISP
resolvers and DNS tunnels.
REMeDy finds 7 anomalies among open resolvers. We have
tracked these cases to content filtering. Security suites like
Comodo or Norton deploy resolvers that implement parental
control or prevent users from contacting malicious domains.
Filtering is performed by steering the traffic of particular
domains towards a controlled server. As a result, this behavior
3http://tstat.tlc.polito.it
TABLE V: Number of detected manipulations in ISP1.
Type #Resolvers #Manipulating
ISP resolver 14 0
Open resolver 43 7
Malware 33 19
Tunnels 21 0
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Fig. 4: Number of manipulated domains as a function of time
in ISP1 trace.
is marked as anomalous by REMeDy. Even if not related to
malicious activity, these are cases of DNS manipulations.
Among 33 resolvers related to malware, the system finds
anomalies in 19. REMeDy does not find anomalies in 14
malware resolvers. Manual inspection points to the following
reasons: (i) the number of observations for (R,ASN) is still
below the thresholds (8 cases), (ii) no domain apparently
manipulated – i.e., the malware was likely inactive during
the captures (1 case), (iii) resolvers use different mechanisms
to hijack the traffic, without manipulating legitimate requests,
e.g., they hijack only NXDOMAIN responses (5 cases). The
last two cases are out of scope for REMeDy, whereas the
first would eventually be detected if longer monitoring is
performed. We conclude that, when enough traffic is observed,
REMeDy is able to identify forged DNS resolutions.
Finally, we evaluate the time needed by REMeDy to detect
manipulations. Fig. 4 focuses on 4 resolvers that are active
during the whole duration of the capture. We plot the number
of domains that the resolver has manipulated as a function
of the capture time. The figure shows that some resolvers
manipulate popular domains and, thus, are detected quickly.
AdWare 1 manipulates 12 domains, and it has already been
identified in the first hours of the capture. Other resolvers
focus on less popular domains. Norton’s resolver only shows
signs of manipulations after six days. This happens because,
being a completely passive system, the detection of DNS
manipulations depends of the users’ activity.
C. Which domains are manipulated?
We now evaluate which domains are typically manipulated.
We report the results obtained when running REMeDy on the
three datasets. REMeDy identifies 37 manipulating resolvers
in total, some of them present in more than one dataset.
Seven resolvers perform legitimate manipulations related
to content filtering as explained above. The remaining 30
resolvers are related to AdWare malwares. They manipulate
responses related to advertising and tracking services in order
to inject content (e.g., ads) while victims browse the web.
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Fig. 5: Manipulated resolutions found in ISP1 dataset. Resolvers are green circles, domains are red.
In particular, we find a massive infection caused by DNS-
Unlocker AdWare involving more than 40 clients and 18 rogue
resolvers.4
In Fig. 5 we represent the manipulations discovered in ISP1
as a graph, connecting resolvers to the domains they manip-
ulate. Two clusters are evident: AdWare resolvers manipulate
advertising domains (right-hand side), while (legitimate) se-
curity suites manipulate traffic related to malware and adult
websites (left-hand side).
Such visualization allows analysts to separate benign ma-
nipulations from the malicious ones. In future work we plan
to use this kind of representation to automatically classify ma-
nipulations, and disambiguate legitimate cases (e.g., antivirus)
from malicious ones.
IV. LIMITATIONS
We briefly discuss limitations of current REMeDy design.
First, REMeDy finds manipulations under the assumption
that popular resolvers (e.g., the ISP resolvers) are legitimate.
As such, if the most popular resolvers also manipulate re-
sponses, REMeDy will consider those legitimate responses and
mark all remaining resolvers as anomalous. We argue that this
is not a severe issue as REMeDy is designed to support the
network administrators, likely aware of such situations.
REMeDy may also neglect manipulations when the legit-
imate and the fake server lie on the same AS. We consider
this scenario unlikely, but will investigate it further in future
work. Finally, REMeDy does not target some anomalies such
as the hijacking of NXDOMAIN responses. We plan to extend
REMeDy to detect such anomalies too.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We presented REMeDy, a system to detect manipulated
DNS responses. REMeDy is a completely automatic and
parameter-free system that exploits passive traffic measure-
ments. It checks the consistency of DNS responses across
multiple resolvers, and exploits anomaly detection techniques
to pinpoint manipulations.
4More information at https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/06/02/
crouching-tiger-hidden-dns/
We run REMeDy on large traces collected from opera-
tional networks. It has identified 37 manipulating resolvers.
We noticed a wide spread of AdWare resolvers that inject
ads on victims’ browsers. REMeDy evidenced also benign
manipulations, used for parental control or for preventing users
from contacting malicious services.
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